Objective: To analyze the reporting of statistical inference in psychiatry.
are better suited to instruct readers on all three counts: effect size, precision, and reflecting the continuous nature of a phenomenon.
Methodologists have therefore argued for abandoning p values because they do not see scientific merit in null hypothesis ST (Rothman, 1978; Stang & Rothman, 2011) . Instead, they propose its replacement by data descriptors and CIs (Rothman, 1978; Stang & Rothman, 2011) ; for a dissenting view, see Wellek (2017) . At the very least, methodological recommendations in medicine and psychology have moved towards an emphasis of CIs (Cohen, 1994; ICMJE, 1988; Wilkinson, 1999) . In their author instructions, some general medical journals such as The Lancet (2017) or JAMA (2017) and some specialty journals, for example, Chest (2017) advocate the description of data and the presentations of CIs. Beginning in 1988, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors in its Recommendations for scholarly work in medical journals warned against "relying solely on statistical hypothesis testing" (ICMJE, 2017) . In a similar vein, the authors of CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials) advise researchers: "The use of confidence intervals has increased markedly in recent years […] . Although P values may be provided in addition to confidence intervals, results should not be reported solely as P values" (Moher et al., 2010) .
However, it seems that p values are still very frequently employed in the medical literature, often without accompanying CIs: Chavalarias, Wallach, Li, and Ioannidis (2016) CIs follows a descriptive and continuous approach whereas null hypothesis ST is rooted in thinking in dichotomies. Whereas Neyman and Pearson suggested a formalized approach using an a priori fixed level of significance, Fisher (1956) did not have a fixed level of significance in mind and "gave mind to each particular case in the light of his evidence and his ideas." As statistical inference is a key element of the scientific process, it is instructive to investigate the predominant way of reporting statistical inference in a field.
Studies already exist on methodological problems in psychiatric articles, such as inconsistencies between test statistics and p values (Berle & Starcevic, 2007) , deficiencies in the reporting and evaluation of blinding in psychiatric RCTs (Baethge, Assall, & Baldessarini, 2013) , a low replication rate of psychiatric studies (Tajika, Ogawa, Takeshima, Hayasaka, & Furukawa, 2015) , or plain statistical errors (Mcguigan, 1995) . Although there are data on the presence of CIs in research on eating and anxiety disorders (Crosby et al., 2006) , they are limited by the small number of articles analyzed and by the fact that the papers investigated were published between 1980 and 2000. The current and general pattern of describing statistical inference in psychiatry is unknown. larly appeared not earlier than in the mid-70s, the observation period starts in 1975. The number of journals resulted from a compromise between representativeness of high-level psychiatric research and feasibility. We searched journal homepages and the webpage of the ICMJE in order to find whether journals followed ICMJE recommendations and since when ICMJE encouraged the use of CIs (searches were carried out on March 31 and April 2, 2017).
We employed an algorithm that searched for terms connected to statistical inference and handsearched a random sample in order to evaluate the search algorithm. The present study builds upon the methods developed for an earlier project and described in detail in Stang et al. (2016) . In brief, we used SAS (index function) to find p values, comparisons of p values with threshold values (e.g., "≤0.05" or "p < 0.05"), CIs, and the term "signif*". According to the type of statistical inference, we grouped abstracts in eight categories:
1. Neyman-Pearson only (null hypothesis testing only, "NHT only") 
| Statistical analysis
We documented length of abstracts in characters including space character and use of numbers over time for all journals as a group. Fisher's sense only). The algorithm missed some instances when the term "significant" was used in a nonstatistical sense, and from our handsearch, we estimate that 3.6%, 95% CI [2.5, 5.2], of all abstracts contain significance terminology in such a nonstatistical sense as, for example, in the phrase "clinically significant." In a handsearch of a random sample of 200 of all abstracts containing significance terminology, we found that the authors of 29 abstracts used the term in a nonstatistical way, four abstracts contained both meanings (statistical and nonstatistical). We were unable to determine whether a statistical or a nonstatistical meaning was intended in 13 abstracts, and a purely statistical meaning was apparent in 154 abstracts. We also found that, as a rule, authors did not discuss clinical significance in the abstracts once statistical significance was 
| The rise of quantification
On a more basic level, we found that abstracts of research became longer and contained more numbers-findings that echo a tendency towards quantification in science in general. In psychiatry, in particular, a contributing factor may be the disappearance of psychoanalytical articles, with their qualitative approach, from mainstream research.
The process of quantification unfolded over a relatively short period of time: Relative to the 1970s, when a median of two numbers were presented in abstracts, the median is now sevenfold, whereas abstract length has only doubled. Also, this secular trend seems to be ongoing.
More numbers may reflect the rise of better measurement, such as psychopathology scores and brain imaging technology or the development of easy-to-use software, such as EXCEL or SPSS. In many instances, the precision provided by numbers, compared with vague descriptions, is a sign of progress. After all, to replace an impression with a measurement is at the heart of science.
However, the rising use of numbers may also indicate that, currently, we seem to particularly trust figures, or even long for them because they provide welcome simplification. For example, boiling down the severity of a depression to a score on the Hamilton-scale reduces complexity and facilitates communication about groups of patients but also about individuals. Still, it does come at the cost of less specific descriptions. Coincidentally, during the rise of numbers, we have witnessed the demise of the case report (Wilkinson, 2003) -a kind of literature characterized by description rather than quantification. Examples for numbers that reduce complexity and that have become enormously popular in medicine over the last decades include the impact factor and the p value.
| Statistical inference
As the impact-factor, the p value has been criticized for, among other things, oversimplifying reality. However, the ensuing call by some methodologists for estimation over testing has only partly been heeded in psychiatry. CIs have started to appear in top psychiatric journals in the 1990s and can now be found in 22% of all abstracts containing some form of statistical inference, but methodologists may consider this only limited success, in particular in comparison with other fields: In general medicine and epidemiology, CIs became prevalent earlier (beginning with 15% and 19%, resp. in 1985-1989) Note. Any CI-reporting of any CI, CI only-reporting of CIs without continuous or categorical p values and without significance terminology; NHST-null hypotheses significance testing includes any use of ST or NHT regardless of CI reporting; ST only-significance testing only includes reporting of "p equals" with neither p value thresholds nor significance terminology regardless of CI reporting; NHT only-null hypothesis testing only includes reporting of p value thresholds or significance terminology but no "p equals" reporting regardless of CI report. Journals are ordered by Impact factor.
in CI use (any CI) across the disciplines epidemiology and public health may be more instructive. Still, sometimes, CIs appear to be used as another form of significance test rather than as a replacement with a different meaning. The extent of this usage, unfortunately, is impossible to specify with our methodology. We believe this question should be approached in a qualitative analysis of full texts.
Greenland (2017) emphasizes that it is not only thinking in dichotomies ("dichotomania," in his term) that is a key feature of the NHST culture but also "nullism": the tendency to misinterpret statistically nonsignificant analyses as confirmation of the null hypothesis and reassurance that there is zero difference. He also argues to view statistical inference as what it is, a speculative model of the world rather than a physical law. The recent years saw a decline in absolute numbers of abstracts.
| Heterogeneity of the journal landscape
This may reflect efforts by journal editors to get rid of types of papers that are usually rarely cited (e.g., brief reports or educational material)
by not publishing such material any longer or by publishing it without abstracts (so that it will not be included in the Impact factor denominator). A case in point is World Psychiatry (2015 impact factor: 20.2)
-a journal that, in the past, published a considerable part of its original material as letters without abstracts. They are therefore a worthwhile object of research in themselves, but future analyses may focus on full texts. Also, there is a dearth of investigations in other specialties in medicine.
| Limitations
It is possible that the content of the journals selected has shifted over time. For example, journals may have decided to publish more research reports instead of review articles. Such a change would probably have led to increased display of statistical inference in a journal, but it seems unlikely to result in massive changes in the proportion of the different sorts of statistical inference under study in this project.
In conclusion, our findings indicate that despite recommendations to the contrary, many researchers or reviewers or journal editors in psychiatry hold on to p values in almost all research papers containing statistical inference. It is possible that the trend towards CIs witnessed in general medicine and, particularly, in epidemiology takes longer in psychiatry, but it is also imaginable that researchers in psychiatry highly value that p values reduce complexity. Either way, the use of CIs in abstracts should be encouraged in order to improve the presentation of statistical inference in psychiatry.
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